Operators and Infrastructure Manger (IM) in railway systems with some level of vertical 5 separation. By modeling a corridor whose users are long-distance high-speed trains and freight 6 trains along the entire corridor, and commuter trains offering services around large urban areas in 7 the corridor, this paper narrows down the focus on each individual operator, looking at the 8 factors that drive each operator's ultimate service levels. Assuming an environment where the 9
TOs are competing for capacity, financial goals and boundary conditions of each TO are derived, 10 and a number of sensitivity analyses for various typical and extreme conditions are performed. 11
This model allows to anticipate how TOs would respond to track-access charges, and can thus 12 help the government, the regulators, and the IMs in the design of appropriate capacity pricing 13 and allocation schemes. 14
INTRODUCTION 1
The underlying motivation for this work is to improve capacity pricing and capacity allocation 2 regulation on shared railway systems. Defining appropriate track-access charges and track-access 3 rights as part of these regulations is important to a well-functioning railway network because it 4 helps prevent inefficient use of scarce rail infrastructure capacity. Urban density, narrow rail 5 rights-of-way, funding challenges, environmental concerns, and localized opposition can present 6 insurmountable obstacles to infrastructure expansion, making optimal use of existing capacity 7 critical. 8
In Stephen Gibson describes the unique nature of railway capacity and the impact of 3 heterogeneous service patterns and train speeds. Gibson provides a brief overview of capacity 4 pricing and capacity allocation mechanisms which he divides into cost-based mechanisms in 5 which the operator pays a track-access charge that reflects the value of "consumed 6 infrastructure", and quantity-based mechanisms in which the TOs disclose their willingness to 7 pay to access the infrastructure, and the IM makes decisions about who gets access to capacity Operations Advisory Commission. The role of this commission is to develop a plan for the future 14 of the corridor, including a plan to charge infrastructure track-access charges (fees). Amtrak 15 must not cross-subsidize commuter, intercity and freight services, and each service must pay the 16 costs incurred by operating that service on the network (can be interpreted as 17 "operating/marginal/direct cost recovery"), as well as proportionate costs that can be distributed 18 to more than one service (can be interpreted as "fixed cost recovery"). This infrastructure 19 charging formula must be implemented six years after the passage of the law, so some time in being implemented. However, as the implementation document has not been adopted at the time 26 of this writing, the extent of the changes that this document will bring is not totally clear. 27
Directive 2001/14/EC was vague in the way it was written by design, as each country's railways 28 were in a different financial state. This resulted in having different charging systems in each 29 country, with different cost recovery goals. In looking at competition, the international market 30 has already been opened for competition, and domestic markets within each country are being 31 opened one-by-one. 32
33

TRAIN OPERATOR MODEL 34
This problem analyzes a corridor capable of supporting high-speed or long-distance passenger 35 service and freight rail service as well as commuter rail service around large urban areas along 36 the corridor. This is not unlike the NEC or the California San Francisco-Los Angeles-San Diego 37
Coast Line in the U.S. Rail capacity is fixed in our medium-term time horizon; that is, there is no 38 opportunity to make infrastructure improvements that will increase the maximum train 39 throughput of the corridor. TOs may be able to adjust their capacity to better serve the users in 40 this time frame. 41 1 FIGURE 1 Prototypical rail corridor to be evaluated 2 Long-distance and high-speed operators are not differentiated, as their intercity operating 3 patterns are very similar. If a high-speed line exists, TOs will operate at the maximum possible 4 speed to compete with other modes, since a lower-speed long-distance operator is assumed to be 5 less competitive, often including services with differing number of stops. 6
In order to analyze TO profits and cash flows, a simplified model that captures main 7 revenue and cost streams is proposed for the medium-term time-horizon [4]. TOs are assumed to 8 be rational entities, and will only operate if their cash flows (after recovering capital costs at an 9 adequate rate of return) are positive in the medium term. TOs are driven by profit maximization. 10
TOs' main decisions are about the number of services that they are willing to operate, their 11 willingness to pay to access the infrastructure, and the fares or shipping rate that they will charge 12 the final users. The two main sources of revenue come from the government, (subsidies), and from 28 transporting users (cargo or passenger). The revenues obtained from transporting users can be 29 determined by multiplying the fare or shipping rate ( ) by the demand transported. The demand 30 transported is limited by either the capacity (reduced by a reasonable average loading factor) of 31 the trains ( ) by user demand ( ). According to literature, user transportation demand 32 depends fundamentally on the fare ( ), the frequency of the service (proportional to ), and the 33 travel time ( ) [5] . While intercity passengers are typically more sensitive to the fare and the 34 travel time, commuter passengers are typically more sensitive to the fare and the frequency, and 35 freight users tend to be sensitive to the fare. 36 Summarizing, the costs and revenues of a TO can be determined using the following 1 formulas: 2
where bold letters are used to denote the main TOs' decision variables. Note that some of these 5 variables may be pre-determined or conditioned by regulations. For instance, the fare of 6 commuter services is typically set by the government. Likewise, access charges under cost-7 allocation and priority-rule mechanisms are fixed inputs for TOs. 8
As a result the main decisions of the TO can be characterized knowing that: 9
The TO level of service and the fares, given the access charges (ac), can be determined 10 maximizing profits: 11 (3) 12 (4) 13 Equation (4) is equivalent to:
. 14 The TO willingness to pay to access the infrastructure, given the level of service and the 15 fare (n,f), can be determined ensuring that the resulting cash flow is positive: 16
Note that CAPEX and financing costs are also required to compute cash flows. However, 18
we will assume initially that TOs have almost no CAPEX and negligible financing costs. 19 function of the fare can be determined using . 30
Calculations: 31
The optimal level of service and fare ( ) to maximize profits can be determined separating 32 the problem in two subcases:
If , i.e., if the demand transported is determined by the 1 capacity of the trains scheduled then we can start computing which is the optimal fare for a given 2 level of service . In this case, obtaining the fare that maximizes profits is equivalent to 3 obtain the fare that maximizes revenues. That means to maximize the fare with the objective of 4 ensuring a demand ( ) still higher to or equal than the capacity 5 (
). Doing the computation we obtain: 6 (8) 7 Given this, the optimal level of service can be obtained maximizing profits: 8
Assuming that track-access charges are linear ( ), the optimal level 10 of service is either: 11 (10) 12 (11) 13
Note that these computations assume that any level of service is possible. Slight 14 adjustments should be made to obtain the optimal solutions considering that possible service 15 levels are discrete (integer number of trains). 16
Case 2: if, conversely, , i.e., if the demand transported is constrained 17 by the users' demand, we can still compute the optimal fare for each level of service . 18
Again, maximizing profits is equivalent to maximize revenues. That means to maximize the 19 revenue with the objective of ensuring a demand ( ) lower than 20 the capacity ( ). Doing the computation we obtain: 21 (12) 22 Given this, the optimal level of service can be obtained maximizing profits: 23
Assuming again that track-access charges are linear ( ), we obtain 25 that the optimal level of service is: 26
Summarizing, the optimal level of service and fare ( ) to maximize profits are either: 28
, or (15) 30
Implications: 1
Despite the complex mathematical expressions, these formulas can be distilled to obtain some 2 implications: 3 1. When variable costs are small with respect to the fares that users can afford, the 4 optimal solution is to maximize revenues and offer the minimum number of trains 5 that allow serving all the demand for the optimal fare. 6 2. When variable costs are comparable to the fares that users can afford, the optimal 7 solution is a trade-off between maximizing revenues and covering variable costs. In 8 this case, the capacity should be optimized in such a way that most demand is served 9 without providing excess train capacity. 10 3. Finally, in those cases in which the users cannot viably accept a fare level that allows 11
TOs to cover at least the variable costs, the TO should not operate any train. 12
We can illustrate these points with an example, inspired in the Amtrak These formulas can also be used to determine maximum track-access charges that the TO 4 would be able to bare. Considering these values, an operator like Amtrak would be able to 5 continue operating trains with track-access charges around $50,000 per train and per day, but 6 with a low level of service. The TO would not operate any service with track-access charges 7 above $60,000 per train per day. 8
Note that although both strategies point out that a lower level of service than the one 9 currently operated with higher fares would lead to higher profits, it also shows that any effort to 10 reduce fares in the corridor would lead to higher demand from the TO to schedule trains in the 11 infrastructure. Similar results are obtained for a broad range of fare elasticity values: lower 12 elasticity representing business users willing to pay high fares to ride convenient Amtrak 13 services, and higher elasticity representing additional users that start to ride Amtrak instead of 14 other transportation alternatives. 15 16 Scenario 2: Determining the level of service and track-access charges willingness to pay 1 when fares are constant (either because demand is very elastic to fares, i.e., almost all the 2 demand is lost if a user's fare is above certain fare threshold or fares are set by the 3 government ) and demand depends on level of service. 4
In this scenario, the elasticity to the level of service can be defined as ⁄ ⁄ where is 5 the average headway between consecutive trains. Since the headway is proportional to ⁄ , the 6 elasticity can also be computed as . Therefore, the demand can be determined 7 by . 8
Calculations: 9
The optimal level of service and fare ( ) to maximize profits can be determined repeating 10 the same type calculations carried out for Scenario 1. Assuming again that track-access charges 11 are linear ( ), it is determined that the optimal level of service that a TO 12 can operate would be either: 13 to variable costs, the optimal strategy would be to ensure that there is no excess-capacity on the 20 trains. Finally, if variable costs are much higher than the revenues per train, the TO should not 21 operate any train. 22
Note that this level of service is independent on the level of subsides and the fixed costs 23
(from operations and access-charges). These values would only affect to whether the TO cash 24 flow are positive and hence the TO can sustainably operate these level of service. 25
Implications 26
This scenario is representative of the situation of the commuter rail TOs in the NEC. According 27 to [10] [11] a TO like the MBTA, the commuter operator in the Boston area, faces fixed 28 operational (direct) costs of per day and variable operational costs of 29 per train and per day. The elasticity of the demand with respect to the headway 30 (frequency) is estimated by [12] to be equal to . In 2014, MBTA's average fare ranged 31 from (average fare of are considered), the level of service averaged 32 trains per day, with a realized demand of passengers per day. The train 33 average capacity considered is passengers, with + load factor. Subsidies 34 per day are considered following [10] [11]. 35
Using these parameters as inputs in the formulas we obtain that:1 2 FIGURE 3 MBTA's expected profits for different track-access variable charges using 3 different strategies to determine the level of service 4
In the case of MBTA, only the first part of equation 16 produces a non-zero level of 5 service. FIGURE 3 compares current MBTA profits with the expected profits when the profit 6 maximizing strategy presented in equation 16 is used to determine the level of service. The 7 results show that higher profits can be unlocked by reducing the number of services, especially 8 when variable costs increase due to track-access charges. Note that, under both strategies, despite 9 of the subsidy, the TO would not be able to operate if access charges exceed $2,000 per train per 10 day. 11 where is the highest possible expected demand, and a new elasticity 5 is defined to simplify the calculations. This scenario has been designed to represent freight 6 operators in railway systems like the NEC. This scenario assumes zero subsidies. For simplicity, 7
we will also assume that the demand is expressed in terms of the number of trains (there is 8 demand for a freight train or not). 9
Calculations 10
In this case, since no operator will be interested in operating a freight train if there 11 is no demand for it. As a result, for a given number of trains ( ), the fare (shipping rate) that a 12 monopolistic operator would charge to the users is:
. 13
The TO's willingness to pay to access the infrastructure can then be computed using 14 In this case, shipping rates are constant due to the high elasticity. The operator cannot 29 raise rates because he will lose a significant part of demand nor can he lower rates because track 30 capacity is scarce and he will not be able to satisfy the increased demand. 31
Note that if the freight operator is not sure of which train (if any) would be scheduled, it 32 should ensure that the profits are positive even in the worst possible scenario (only one train 33 scheduled). As a consequence, if the demand is very elastic to the tariff, . 34
Conversely, if the freight operator is able to schedule trains, then the track-access 1 charges he would be willing to pay would be: , that is, $ , more 2 per train than for a single train if demand is very elastic to the shipping rate. As a result, if the 3 fixed costs are high and the demand is extremely elastic, a regulation that ensures that the 4 operator would be able to schedule at least trains would be very beneficial. 5 6 FIGURE 4 Freight operator track-access charge: willingness to pay as a function of 7 number of trains scheduled for high demand elasticity 8
With such regulation, track-access charges that the operators will be able to pay will be : 9 , that is, the freight operator will be able to offer more per 10 train. 11
Case 2: Assuming a maximum demand ̅ trains per day, an elasticity of , 12 variable costs of per train and per day and moderate fixed costs of per 13 day, the optimal shipping rate as a function of the level of service is: 14 per train. Maximum access charges willingness to pay shown in equation (20) In this case, due to the lower level of the elasticity, the operator has power to increase 18 shipping rates without significantly impacting demand. Since the operator's total variable cost is 19 increasing and the fixed cost per train is decreasing with increasing freight service, there is an 20 optimal level of service at which the operator's track-access charges willingness to pay is 21 maximized. Note that operators should not necessarily respond to decreasing track-access 22 charges by increasing service; that is, the low demand elasticity to shipping rates corresponds to 23 a low derived demand to schedule trains elasticity to track-access charges. This case shows that when operator fixed costs are low and demand elasticity is less than 12 1, the operator's track-access charges willingness to pay decreases by the inverse of elasticity 13 with each additional train scheduled. Similar results are obtained with ̅ trains per 1 day, following the current level of freight service operated in the NEC today. Note again that the 2 use of this model allows the government, the regulator, or the IM to determine the maximum 3 access charges that a freight TO is able to pay without the need of extensive information about 4 the TO operation. 5 6
CONCLUSIONS AND FURTHER RESEARCH 7
This research is of use for train operators -both railway agencies and railway operators -8 because it provides insight regarding fares and level of service that TOs could operate to 9 maximize profits for different levels of track-access charges. In the United States, railway 10 agencies, equipped with knowledge of budgetary constraints, cost data, and infrastructure 11 charges, could use this research as a starting point for cost-estimation and as a tool to check the 12 reasonableness of service level assumptions before tendering operating contracts. Railway 13 operators could likewise use the tool to measure the long term viability of their operating plans. 14 This research provides value to infrastructure managers in that it elucidates the challenges 15 of managing a corridor with multiple railroad operators. As shown in our scenarios, certain forms 16 of regulation and access charges can stifle operator service expansion and cost the IM revenues 17 needed to maintain the infrastructure in a state-of-good repair. In order for this research to add 18 value to IMs, they must anticipate and understand the service goals and infrastructure needs of 19 operators on their network. 20
It is worth noting that this research is a first step in that it does not consider infrastructure 21
constraints. The next step would be to consider how much of the services that the TOs would like 22 to provide can be scheduled in the existing infrastructure. Assuming there is more demand for 23 scheduling train paths than the infrastructure can allow, regulation is required to allocate capacity 24 between operators. 25 Government and regulators can use this research as a tool to help understand the industry 26 landscape. In the U.S. the use of these types of models is important to evaluate how the railway 27 system would respond to new capacity pricing and allocation regulation like the one to be 28 implemented in the Northeast Corridor. The European Union's stated goal of increasing rail 29 market share in the transportation sector depends on sound regulation of track access charges and 30 striking a balance between creating a competitive environment and one in which both TOs and 31
IMs with high fixed costs can thrive. 32
On the political side, institutional constrains play just as an important role as 33 infrastructure constrains. Certain agencies may have public service requirements that dictate 34 station stops or certain levels of service such as travel time or frequency of service. Further 35 research will reveal how these institutional constraints affect all of the aforementioned players. 36
Certain political requirements may lead to capacity inefficiencies; further research can quantify 37 those inefficiencies and lead to recommendations for improving regulation. 38
Further research directions would also include gathering additional real-world data to 39 validate the findings and evaluate train operators' historical decisions regarding service levels. 40
The assumption of no intra-modal competition could be changed to look at the resulting effects 41 on service plans as it already happens in countries like Italy, where Trenitalia and Italo provide 42 high-speed rail services in the same infrastructure. This would require better quantification of 1 demand cross-elasticity of fare, travel time, and frequency. 2
